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Abstract
The worst and longest depressions have tended to occur after periods of prolonged, and reason-
ably stable, prosperity. This results in part from agents rationally updating their expectations
during good times and hence becoming more optimistic about future economic prospects. In-
vestors then increase their leverage and shift their portfolios towards projects that would previ-
ously have been considered too risky. So, when a downturn does eventually occur, the financial
crisis, and the extent of default, become more severe. Whereas a general appreciation of this
syndrome dates back to Minsky [1992, Jerome Levy Economics Institute, WP 74] and even
beyond, to Irving Fisher [1933, Econometrica 1, 337-357], we model it formally. In addition,
endogenous default introduces a pecuniary externality, since investors do not factor in the im-
pact of their decision to take risk and default on the borrowing cost. We explore the relative
advantages of alternative regulations in reducing financial fragility, and suggest a novel criterion
for improvement of aggregate welfare.
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1 Introduction
The second theorem of Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis, (Minsky (1992)), states that over
periods of prolonged prosperity and optimism about future economic prospects, financial institu-
tions invest more in riskier assets, which can make the economic system more vulnerable in the
case that default materializes. Minsky’s hypothesis emphasizes the interaction between optimism
and leverage, and the ensuing increase in portfolio riskiness. This triplet lies at the heart of many
financial crises that manifest themselves with extensive default.
In this paper, we focus on the role that expectations formation about future states of the economy
-in the sense of investment profitability and growth- plays in the borrowing decision of investors,
in their portfolio choice, and eventually in the extent of default in the economy.1 We thus exam-
ine the effect of leverage, as a path-dependent process, on financial stability, by linking learning to
risk-taking behaviour. In particular, we consider investors that face a multiperiod portfolio problem.
In each period, they use their own capital, augmented by accumulated profits, in combination with
short-term borrowing to invest in projects, which mature in one period as well. The absence of
any maturity mismatch is unimportant for our results, as we shall be abstracting from any fire sales
externality, which should be regarded as complementary to our modeling. Credit is raised from a
competitive credit market. Given endogenous default, the borrowing rate, which depositors will re-
quire, will be endogenously determined by expectations of future repayment on loans, and hence an
endogenous default premium emerges in equilibrium. This will depend on depositors’ information
and understanding of the portfolio choices of investors.
We assume two types of projects and two states of the world that occur in every period, one of
which is good, whereas the other is bad. Although both projects are risky, their payoffs differ and
one is riskier than the other under any probability distribution, which assigns positive probability
to both states. We assume that the outcomes are perfectly correlated in the sense that both do well
in the good state and poorly in the bad state, and that both projects are in perfectly elastic supply,
thus abstracting from the general equilibrium effects of projects’ origination and supply.2 Investors
1We refer to the agents in our model as investors, which can be any financial institution or asset management company
in the broad sense, engaging in borrowing in order to invest in projects/assets.
2Endogenising project supply can allow the study of asset price bubbles together with variations in the leverage cycle.
Adam and Marcet (2010) and Branch and Evans (2011) use a different learning model to explain bubbles and crashes in
asset prices. We leave this interesting extension for future work.
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choose their portfolio of projects, at each point in time, according to their expectations about the
future realization of payoffs and the borrowing rates that they may face. The projects’ payoffs do not
change over time. However, the perceived belief about the likelihood of good realizations changes
over time according to past realizations. Following Cogley and Sargent (2008), we assume that
agents have incomplete information about the true probability measure. They learn it over time by
observing the past realizations and updating their priors.3 The fluctuation of portfolio composition
and leverage are due to the variability of beliefs in finite time, although they will converge to the
true probability measure in the limit. We show that financial institutions will start investing in the
riskier project after a number of good past realizations, since their expectations are boosted and,
consequently, the risk/return profile from an individual perspective improves.
Our second contribution to an otherwise canonical portfolio problem is the modeling of endoge-
nous default and of a separate market for credit. The interest rate charged on loans depends on the
expectations about future repayment. Creditors hold beliefs about the debtors’ portfolios and, ac-
cordingly, update their expectations about the future realization of payoffs and subsequent defaults,
subject to their information set. We thus connect the credit spread to risk taking via the introduc-
tion of endogenous default. Low credit spreads allow investors to borrow more. Whereas if they
keep increasing their risk taking, the credit spreads will increase. Risk taking is penalized ex-post
via penalties for default, and ex-ante via higher borrowing rates. Nevertheless, expectations, in our
framework, vary over time and optimism increases after periods of good news. Riskier projects
become more attractive for investors since the expected penalty for default decreases. Moreover,
expectations about the possibility of default go down and so creditors are willing to offer low bor-
rowing rates even though debtors invest more in the riskier project.
The introduction of endogenous default and endogenous credit spreads yields two additional
implications apart from the fact that investment in riskier projects increases with optimism. The first
implication is that optimism and risk-taking are accompanied by lower risk premia. This facilitates
the build-up of risk, since investors are not penalized with higher borrowing costs when they take on
more risk. In particular, our model draws the distinction between observed default rates during good
times and implicit default rates when a bad shock realizes. Lower (or zero in our model) default
3One might ask why enough time has not elapsed since the innovation of fractional banking to allow the learning
process to converge to the true probability measure. The answer is that the learning process is itself flawed. As Reinhart
and Rogoff (2008) show, the young think that ’This time it is different’, and the old have retired and disappeared.
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rates result in optimism and risk-taking. However, conditional on a future bad realization, default
and risk premia increase. The empirical implications of our model can be seen in the evolution of
market volatility and credit premia before and during the financial crisis of 2007-2008, which we
discuss in the conclusions. Moreover, we calibrate our model in section 4 to capture some of the key
characteristics of the 2007-2008 subprime crisis. The second implication is that optimism results
in excessive and socially inefficient risk taking. Thus, we do not merely describe situations where
premia are low and investors take more risk, but also argue that this leads to excessive risk-taking
and, thus, there is scope for regulation to improve welfare.
Arguably, there are always going to be cycles of optimism and pessimism, both in finance and
elsewhere, and there is not much that we can, or perhaps should, do to prevent them. There are sev-
eral reasons why banking and finance involve externalities that generate particular amplifications to
a potential debt-deflation spiral. The pioneer of such a view was Fisher (1933), who suggested a
Debt-Deflation theory of Great Depressions. His analysis was based on two fundamental principles,
namely over-indebtedness and deflation. He argued that over-indebtedness can result in deflation
in future periods and, subsequently, cause liquidation of collateralised debt. This theory brings
financial intermediation to the center of attention. Numerous studies have subsequently built on
the debt-deflation theory of financial amplification to analyse the effect of collateral constraints on
borrowing, production and, eventually, financial stability. In a seminal paper, Bernanke and Gertler
(1989) modeled a collateral-driven credit constraint, which introduced an external finance premium,
and analysed interactions between the balance sheet of financial institutions and the real economy.
Debt-deflation dynamics may also give rise to another important externality, that of fire sales -to
institutions that can, at times, realize less value from such assets- which can act as an amplifica-
tion mechanism in financial crises. Financially distressed institutions liquidate their assets to meet
their debt obligations, and in doing so, they reduce the value of their own and other institutions’
portfolios, which exacerbates the fire sale discounts, and further worsens their debt position.
We do not pursue such an analysis here, partly because it has been so thoroughly examined
elsewhere.4 Indeed, there are other approaches to financial crises that we do not cover. In particular,
4Mendoza (2006) and Mendoza and Smith (2006) analyse the role of fire sales in Sudden Stops in emerging markets
within an RBC model. Geanakoplos (2003) and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) show how the arrival of bad news about
the future economic prospects results in a reduction in the price of assets used as collateral and leads to a drying up of
liquidity and fire-sales externalities. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show how the
borrowing capacity of agents, i.e. funding liquidity, and the pricing of assets, i.e. market liquidity, interact and how an
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we do not model bank run externalities arising from coordination problems (Diamond and Dybvig
(1983)), network externalities (Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) , Rochet and Tirole (1996)), or market
freezes due to portfolio opaqueness and unduly pessimistic beliefs (Dubey et al. (2005), Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981)). Instead, the externality that we do address is that investors do not incorporate the
impact of their portfolio and default decisions on borrowing rates since they are price takers in
the credit market. Investors take on more downside risk by over-investing in the riskier assets.
Therefore, they are likely to default more, and as a result their borrowing rates rise, which causes
even more default, and so on. A social planner understands the impact of risk-taking on interest
rates and the deadweight loss associated with default, and does not switch to the riskier asset as fast
as individual investors do after a series of good realizations due to their higher optimism.
We consider three policy responses to tackle the issue of excessive risk-taking accompanied by
high leverage; stricter penalties for default, lower permitted leverage ratios, and finally our novel
criterion that puts a lower bound on the ratio of safer minus riskier portfolio holdings over total bor-
rowing. Only the latter is successful in both reducing the amount of default and in increasing aggre-
gate welfare, since it addresses risk taking during optimistic times directly. Compared to the use of
a crude leverage ratio, our proposal regarding optimal regulation resembles a combination of lever-
age ratios on all assets, which is responsive to their relative riskiness in the cross-section. Hence,
it is close to the regulatory proposal of Geanakoplos (2010) who suggested higher margin/haircut
requirements on bank generated asset holdings during good times. We discuss the difference in
more detail in section 5.
Finally, we discuss the empirical implications of our paper. We argue that the underlying reason
why commonly used return-based risk measures, such as VIX or the TED spread,5 failed to capture
the build-up of risk before the 2007-2008 crisis is that they were biased by optimistic expectations,
as are the credit spreads in our model. Boz and Mendoza (2014) consider a learning model in
which agents update their expectations about the leverage constraints they will face, as exogenous
idiosyncratic liquidity shock can lead to fire-sales and the unraveling of the whole market. Other papers, which model
fire-sales due to adverse productivity or funding shocks to capture debt-deflationary effects on asset prices, leading to loss
spirals and financial instability, include Acharya et al. (2011), Diamond and Rajan (2011), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992). Adrian and Shin (2009) investigate the importance of this channel
empirically for financial institutions.
5VIX is the CBOE Volatility Index, created by the Chicago Board Options Exchange as a measure of equity market
volatility. The computation of the value of VIX is based on the implied volatility of eight option series on the S&P 100
index. The TED spread is the difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and on short-term U.S. government
debt.
5
multiples of asset values, which will prevail in the future. They examine the interaction between
their borrowing constraints and the mispricing of risk. A sequence of periods characterised by lax
borrowing constraints induces optimistic expectations about the continuation of such regimes, and
leads to the underpricing of risk, high leverage, and over inflated collateral values. A sharp collapse
then follows after the realization (exogenously) of a tighter constraint. We regard, in contrast, that
our quantity-based measure, capturing the shift in portfolios holdings towards riskier projects in
optimistic times, is likely to be more effective in identifying endogenous credit cycles, assuming
that projects’ relative riskiness can still be correctly evaluated when expectations change, although
each of the projects may look safer.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, we offer
an analytical solution which explores the implications for divergences across private and socially
optimal risk-taking. In section 4, we present a calibrated example of our model and extend our
arguments. In section 5, we assess quantitatively the relative performance of alternative regulatory
regimes. Section 6 discusses the empirical implications of our model and concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a multi-period economy populated by a continuum of identical investors with total mass
normalized to 1. Hereafter, we consider the problem of the representative investor. At any date t =
0, . . . ,T , the economy can be in one of two states, denoted by u (“up"/good state) and d (“down"/bad
state) respectively. For example, the "up" state at time t is denoted by st = st−1u. The set of
all states is st ∈ S = {0,u,d, . . . ,uu,ud,du,dd, . . . ,stu,std, . . .}. The probability that a good state
occurs at any point in time is denoted by θ, which is chosen by nature. For simplicity we assume
that θ∈ {θ1,θ2}with 1> θ1 > θ2 > 0. However, agents do not know this probability and try to infer
it by observing past realizations of good and bad states. Agents have priors Pr(θ= θ1) and Pr(θ=
θ2) = 1−Pr(θ= θ1) that the true probability is θ1 or θ2 respectively. Their subjective belief in state
st of a good state occurring at t+1 is denoted by pist and that of the bad 1−pist . These probabilities
depend on the whole history of realizations up to t. In other words, pist = Prst (st+1 = stu|s0, . . . ,st).
Given our notation, state st completely summarizes the history of realizations up to t. Thus, pist =
Prst (st+1 = stu|s0, . . . ,st) = Prst (st+1 = stu|st). We assume that past realizations of the states of the
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world are observable by all agents, thus there is no information asymmetry on top of the imperfect
information structure.
Consequently, agents’ subjective belief is pist =Prst (θ= θ1 |st ) ·θ1+Prst (θ= θ2 |st ) ·θ2. Agents
are Bayesian updaters and try to learn from past realizations the true probability θ. Their conditional
probability given past realizations is:
Prst (θ= θ1 |st ) =
Prst (st |θ= θ1 ) ·Pr(θ= θ1)
Pr(st)
=
Prst (st |θ= θ1 ) ·Pr(θ= θ1)
Prst (st |θ= θ1 ) ·Pr(θ= θ1)+Prst (st |θ= θ2 ) ·Pr(θ= θ2)
=
θn1(1−θ1)t−n ·Pr(θ= θ1)
θn1(1−θ1)t−n ·Pr(θ= θ1)+θn2(1−θ2)t−n ·Pr(θ= θ2)
,
where n is the number of good realization up to time t. Then,
pist =
θn1(1−θ1)t−n ·Pr(θ= θ1)
θn1(1−θ1)t−n ·Pr(θ= θ1)+θn2(1−θ2)t−n ·Pr(θ= θ2)
θ1
+
θn2(1−θ2)t−n ·Pr(θ= θ2)
θn1(1−θ1)t−n ·Pr(θ= θ1)+θn2(1−θ2)t−n ·Pr(θ= θ2)
θ2. (1)
As the number of good realizations increases, the subjective probability of the good state realizing
in the following period increases as well, i.e. given that st = st−1u, then pist > pist−1 . Assume that the
priors are the same, that is Pr(θ= θ1) = Pr(θ= θ2).
To prove our claim that agents become more optimistic after they observe good outcomes in
the past, we just need to show that Prst (θ = θ1 |st ) > Prst−1(θ = θ1 |st−1 ) and Prst (θ = θ2 |st ) <
Prst−1(θ= θ2 |st−1 ) given that st = st−1u.
Proof.
Prst (θ= θ1 |st )> Prst−1(θ= θ1 |st−1 )
⇒ θ
n+1
1 (1−θ1)t+1−(n+1)
θn+11 (1−θ1)t+1−(n+1)+θn+12 (1−θ2)t+1−(n+1)
>
θn1(1−θ1)t−n
θn1(1−θ1)t−n+θn2(1−θ2)t−n
⇒
(
θ2
1−θ2
1−θ1
θ1
)n(1−θ2
1−θ1
)t
>
(
θ2
1−θ2
1−θ1
θ1
)n+1(1−θ2
1−θ1
)t+1
⇒ 1 > θ2
1−θ2
1−θ1
θ1
1−θ2
1−θ1 ⇒ 1 >
θ2
θ1
.
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To simplify notation, we will use hereafter simply t to denote histories of shocks (st), and we
will refer to these as simply histories or nodes. Using this notation, t−1 will denote the history up
to the previous period, and t+1 will denote all the possible histories following node t.
At t the representative investor faces two investment opportunities; a safer project, denoted by L
(standing for “low" risk), and a riskier one, denoted by H (standing for “high" risk). Both projects
are in perfectly elastic supply, with their prices normalized to 1, and expire in one period. The safer
project yields a payoff XLu in the good state and X
L
d in the bad. Equivalently, the payoffs for the
riskier project are XHu and X
H
d . We assume that X
H
u > X
L
u > 1 > X
L
d > X
H
d > 0, such that the riskier
project is more profitable if the good state realizes. Ex-post payoffs are independent of the history
of past realizations.
Each investor has the following payoff/utility function at t:
Ut =Πt − γ · (Πt)2 , (2)
where γ is the risk aversion coefficient and Πt are the distributed profits in t.
The amount of funds available for investment by investors is equal to their equity capital, plus
funds borrowed from credit markets, plus the profits from the previous period’s investment that
are not distributed as profits and consumed. We consider a general portfolio problem under which
investors decide how much of the available funds to invest in the safer project and how much in the
riskier one. We denote by w jt the portfolio holdings of the investor in project j ∈ {L,H} at t. For
example, the riskier project’s holdings in the second period after a good state realization at t = 1 are
denoted by wHu . The interest rate for borrowing from the credit market is denoted by rt at t.
We allow for default in the credit market. The amount repaid is an endogenous decision by the
investor, who weighs the benefits from defaulting against a deadweight loss. The latter is assumed
to be a linear function of the amount that the investor chooses not to deliver.6 Denoting by 1−vt the
6In the event of default, investors can extract a private benefit, which is pinned down by the exogenously set non-
pecuniary default penalty, given the linearity of the disutility of default. As the marginal penalty for default increases,
the private benefit investors can extract decreases and they have a lower incentive to default. Shubik and Wilson (1977),
Dubey et al. (2005) and Zame (1993) are canonical models of such choice processes. Many papers have followed the
seminal contribution by Dubey et al. (2005) to study the implications of default in different markets settings. For example,
Acharya and Bisin (2014) study the effect of default and transparency on counterparty risk externalities in centralized
and over-the-counter markets. Athreya et al. (2009) study the extent to which unsecured credit markets have altered the
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percentage default on one unit of borrowed funds, the deadweight loss is equal to λ(1−vt)(1+rt−1),
where λ is the default penalty, vt is the percentage repayment on one unit of owned debt and rt−1
is the interest rate set at the node preceding state t. We assume risk-neutral creditors who break
even in expectation and their valuation of the debt is independent of the position they take. Thus,
the interest rate will be inversely related to their expectation about future percentage delivery. The
amount of funds that the investor chooses to borrow is denoted by wt and his initial capital at t = 0
by w¯0. Without loss of generality, investors are not endowed with additional capital for t = 1, . . . ,T .
Each investor tries to maximize his lifetime expected utility by choosing the amount he invests
in the safer and riskier projects at each point in time
(
w jt , j ∈ {L,H}
)
, the amount that he borrows
from the credit market (wt), the percentage repayment on past loans (vt), and the amount of realized
profits that he reinvests (It), i.e.,
max
w jt ,vt+1,Πt+1,It+1
∑
t
Et [Ut+1−λmax [(1− vt+1)wt(1+ rt),0]],
where Et is the expectations operator in state t, under the probability measure pit , when the invest-
ment decision is made, and Ut+1 is given by equation 2. Note that investors do not derive any utility
at t = 0, thus all the funds go to investment, i.e., wL0 +w
H
0 ≤ f (I0)+w0 and f (I0) = w¯0. f (·) is a
concave function which captures a cost of retaining high levels of realized earnings and guarantees
boundedness of the solution for probabilities for the good state approaching one. Every investor
optimizes the payoff function above subject to the following budget constraints:
Πt+1+ It+1 ≤ wLt XLt+1+wHt XHt+1− vt+1wt(1+ rt)
i.e., distributed + retained profits ≤ safer and riskier investments’ payoff - loan repayment in t+1.
wLt+1+w
H
t+1 ≤ f (It+1)+wt+1
i.e., investment in the safer and the riskier projects ≤ reinvested profits + leverage in t.
The second type of agents in our economy are the suppliers of credit. There is a continuum of
creditors who are risk-neutral and have an infinite supply of funds, Hence, they will supply credit in
transmission of increased income risk to consumption variability. Goodhart et al. (2006) and De Walque et al. (2010) have
applied utility penalties for default to study banking stability, while Peiris and Vardoulakis (2013) to study the interaction
between default and the precautionary motive for savings.
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every period at a rate that breaks even in expectation with their outside risk-free option given their
beliefs. We denote by routside their outside option. Also, creditors do not have additional information
and hence they will form the same beliefs as investors at each point in time. In equilibrium, they
require a borrowing rate rt , such that
Et [vt+1] · (1+ rt) = 1+ routside (3)
One can observe the reverse relationship between the interest rate and expected percentage delivery.
When the latter increases, the interest rate charged falls. This provides some intuition for the seem-
ingly counterintuitive result that when expectations are optimistic, investors increase their leverage,
paying lower than otherwise expected interest rates, though at the end their percentage repayment is
lower in a bad state and default is higher. The result follows from the fact that the perceived prob-
ability that a good state realizes is higher, since expectations are optimistic. Thus, overall expected
delivery is higher, though loss given default is higher as well.
Equilibrium is reached when investors optimize given their constraints and the credit and projects’
markets clear. Interest rates are determined endogenously by equation 3 and are taken as fixed by
agents. Credit market clearing requires that equation 3 holds. The above modeling has assumed a
perfectly elastic supply of projects. Equilibrium purchases are determined by investors’ demand at
a given price of 1 for each project. The analysis of equilibrium and our main result that leverage,
investment in the riskier project and realised default all increase when expectations become more
optimistic would not have changed had we assumed an upward sloping supply curve. One can find
endowments of projects that support the price of 1 in equilibrium. Thus, endogenising asset prices
as well would have allowed the joint investigation of changes in leverage and asset prices during a
boom or a bust. We consider this an interesting extension for future work.
The variables determined in equilibrium and taken by agents as fixed are, thus, given by η =
{rt}, t = 0, . . . ,T. The choices by investors are given by 2 =
{
w jt ,wt ,vt+1,Πt+1, It+1
}
. We say
that (η,2) is an equilibrium of the economy if and only if:
i. (2) ∈ Argmax2∈B(η) EtUt .
ii. Et [vt+1] · (1+ rt) = 1+ rotuside.
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iii. w jt ,wt ≥ 0 for j ∈ {L,H}.
iv. Subjective probabilities pit are determined by equation 1.
v. Creditors expectations are rational, i.e. they anticipate correctly the delivery vt .
Condition (i) states that investors optimize; (ii) says that the credit market clears; (iii) says that
investors cannot go short on the credit and projects’ markets; (iv) says that all agents update their
expectations using Bayes rule, and (v) says that creditors are correct about their expectations of loan
delivery or default.
3 Optimism, Risk-taking and Externalities
In this section we present an analytical solution for this model, the intuition for which is Minsky’s
financial instability hypothesis. In section 3.1 we solve for the endogenous variables of the model
and derive propositions about the effect that an increasing probability of a good outcome has on
them. For tractability, we assume that the initial capital of investors is zero and that investors do
not reinvest any of the realized profits at any time t > 0. Thus, their portfolio is fully debt financed.
Under these assumptions, solving for equilibrium reduces to a static problem for which we can
derive a closed form solution. Finally, we assume for simplicity that routside = 0.
A closed form solution is important to show explicitly the externality inherent in our model and
to enable us to perform welfare analysis. Default twists investors utilities by adding a component
which depends on downside risk and represents the disutility of default. Investing in the riskier
project increases downside risk. However, profits in the case of default is pinned down by the
default penalty and does not depend on the probability of a bad realization. This can be easily seen
from the first order condition with respect to the repayment rate, vt , which is λ = 1− 2γΠt , i.e.
investors equate the marginal loss from defaulting to the marginal benefit of an additional unit of
profits/consumption. As expectations improve the (total) expected disutility from default decreases,
while the private benefit in the event of default remains fixed. There is a probability threshold after
which investors start investing in the riskier asset and shift consumption to the good state of the
world.
Increased risk-taking results in higher default, which puts upwards pressure on the borrowing
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rates and the amount owed. Investors do not take into consideration the impact that their portfolio
decisions have on the optimizing decisions of creditors and the resulting borrowing rates. This is a
type of pecuniary externality along the lines of Stiglitz (1982). We show in section 3.2 that a social
planner, who incorporates this externality in her decisions, ceases to invest in the riskier asset. In
particular, borrowing rates go down as does default, and the welfare of investors increases in the
social planner’s solution. Creditors’ welfare is unaffected, since they are risk-neutral and break
even in expectation. Hence, we get a Pareto improvement. Section 3.3 establishes that optimism
exacerbates the risk-taking externality and that it requires distinct regulatory treatment.
3.1 Optimism and Risk-taking
Under the assumptions made above, the investors’ problem reduces to maximizing
max
Πu,Πd ,w,v
U= EΠ− γ ·EΠ2−λ(1−pi)max [(1− v),0]wR,
subject to the budget constraints
Πu ≤ a ·wXLu +(1−a) ·wXHu −wR = w
[
a(XLu −XHu )+XHu −R
]
(µu),
Πd ≤ a ·wXLd +(1−a) ·wXHd − vwR = w
[
a(XLd −XHd )+XHd − vR
]
(µd)
and the short-sale constraints 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, where a stands for the percentage of borrowed funds
invested in the safer asset, L, and w is the amount of borrowing. Thus, agents cannot go short on any
of the two projects. The good and the bad state occur with probabilities pi and 1−pi respectively.
If the bad state occurs, investors choose to repay a fraction v of the amount owed, wR, where
R(= 1+ r) is the gross borrowing rate. µu and µd are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
budget constraints. Finally, the credit market clears when
R =
1
pi+(1−pi)v . (4)
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The Lagrangian is
L=EΠ− γEΠ2−λ(1−pi)max [(1− v),0]wR−µu
[
Πu−w
[
a(XLu −XHu )+XHu −R
]]
−µd
[
Πd−w
[
a(XLd −XHd )+XHd − vR
]]−φ [a−1]+ψ ·a.
The Lagrange multipliers µu and µd are positive due to concave utility, thus the budget con-
straints hold with equality in equilibrium. Investors are price takers and do not factor in the im-
pact of their decision to default on R. They take R as given. Thus, when they optimize they will
take
∂R
∂v
= 0. However, their decision to default does have a price effect, since from equation 4,
∂R
∂v
=−(1−pi)R2. Optimizing with respect to the delivery rate, v, we get
(1−pi)λ= µd . (5)
Moreover, consumption in the event of default satisfies λ= (1−2γΠd). Optimizing with respect to
borrowing, w, we get
µu
[
a(XLu −XHu )+XHu −R
]
+µd
[
a(XLd −XHd )+XHd − vR
]−λ(1−pi)(1− v)R = 0. (6)
Combining the last equation together with equation 5 yields
µu
µd
=−a(X
L
d −XHd )+XHd −R
a(XLu −XHu )+XHu −R
. (7)
The complementary slackness conditions φ [a−1] = 0 and ψ · a = 0 yield the following three
(candidate) equilibrium solutions for percentage investment in the safer asset:
1. The portfolio consists of both assets, i.e., 0 < a < 1. This implies φ= 0 and ψ= 0.
2. The portfolio consists solely of the riskier asset, i.e., a = 0. This implies φ= 0 and ψ> 0.
3. The portfolio consists solely of the safer asset, i.e., a = 1. This implies φ> 0 and ψ= 0.
We consider these three cases in turn and evaluate the range of exogenous parameters such that
each of them holds. We denote by piH , derived below, the probability threshold after which investors
choose only the riskier asset (case 2). The region for which there is investment for both assets is
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pi ∈ [pi∗,piH ) (case 1). Finally, piL stands for the probability threshold after which it is profitable
to invest in the safer asset. Thus, the portfolio consists solely of the safer asset for the region of
pi ∈ [piL,pi∗ ) (case 3). Figure 1 presents the regions corresponding the three cases for a.
Figure 1: Probability regions and investment in assets
We start with the case that investors choose both assets, i.e., 0 < a < 1, since we can easily
derive a closed form solution to evaluate the corner solutions, which correspond to the other two
cases. The first order condition with respect to the allocation, a, of borrowed funds yields
µu
µd
=−X
L
d −XHd
XLu −XHu
. (8)
Combining equations 7 and 8 we can calculate the equilibrium borrowing rate, which is given by
R =
XHu ·XLd −XHd ·XLu
XHu −XHd − (XLu −XLd )
(9)
It is easy to see from the market clearing condition 4 that, as the probability of a good outcome
increases, the repayment rate decreases, i.e.,
∂v
∂pi
=
∂ 11−pi
( 1
R −pi
)
∂pi
=
1
(1−pi)2 (
1
R
−1)< 0, (10)
since R > 1; otherwise creditors would not break even and there would be no trade. We, thus, focus
on values for asset payoffs that yield a gross rate greater than 1 in equation 9, i.e., XHu ·XLd −XHd ·
XLu > X
H
u −XHd − (XLu −XLd ).
Next we need to show that the percentage of borrowed funds, 1−a, invested in the riskier project
increases with the probability of a good outcome. Substituting the budget constraints into the first
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order conditions with respect to consumption,
µu = pi(1−2γΠu) (11)
and
µd = (1−pi)(1−2γΠd), (12)
we can solve for a and w, which yields
a =
(XHu −R)
(
1− µd1−pi
)− (XHd − vR)(1− µupi )
(XLd −XHd )
(
1− µupi
)− (XLu −XHu )(1− µd1−pi) (13)
and
w =
1
2γ
1
a(XLu −XHu )+XHu −R
(
1− µu
pi
)
. (14)
Equations 4, 5, 8, 9, 13, 14, together with 11 and 12 give the closed form solution for all
endogenous variables.
Lemma 1: As the probability of a good realization increases, investors reallocate their portfolio
towards the riskier asset.
See the Appendix for the proof.
The lemma above holds for any pi. To verify that there exists probability regions such that
investors choose both assets, the safer or only the riskier one, we need to prove that pi∗ and piH are
below one (and greater than zero) and that pi∗ < piH . The following proposition establishes these
two facts.
Proposition 1: There are thresholds for the probability of the good state pi∗ and piH , such that
investors choose both assets for pi ∈ [pi∗,piH ) and only the risker asset for pi ∈ [piH ,1]. See the
Appendix for the proof.
For proposition 1 we took the limit of equation 28 in the Appendix as pi→ 0 to prove that there
is a threshold pi∗ such that a(pi∗) = 1. However, for pi < pi∗ investors invest only in the safer asset,
thus a = 1 and φ > 0. We, thus, need to show that there exist piL greater than zero and lower than
pi∗ such that the investor chooses just the safer asset for pi ∈ [piL,pi∗ ). We first establish that the
equilibrium variables w and R (and hence consumption) are continuous at pi∗.
15
For pi < pi∗ the solution for the amount of borrowing, the borrowing rate and the percentage
default are given by
XLu −R
XLd − 1−piR1−pi
=
1− 1−pipi
R−XLd
XLu−Rλ
1−λ , (15)
pi
1−pi
1−2γw(XLu −R)
λ
=
R−XLd
XLu −R
, (16)
R =
1
pi+(1−pi)v . (17)
We evaluate these conditions as pi approaches pi∗ from the left (denoted by pi∗−) and compare them
with those as pi goes to pi∗ from the right (denoted by pi∗+). In the latter region, investors invest in
both assets, but as pi→ pi∗+, a→ 1. The equivalent of equations 15 and 16 as pi→ pi∗+ are
XLu −R
XLd − 1−piR1−pi
=
1− 1−pipi
XLd−XHd
XHu −XLu λ
1−λ (18)
and
pi
1−pi
1−2γw(XLu −R)
λ
=
XHd −XLd
XLu −XHu
. (19)
Evaluating the first order conditions 7 and 8 as pi→ pi∗+ we get that X
L
d −XHd
XHu −XLu
approaches
R(pi∗+)−XLd
XLu −R(pi∗+)
.
From equations 15 and 18 we get that R(pi∗−) = R(pi∗+). Also, v(pi∗−) = v(pi∗+) and w(pi∗−) =
w(pi∗+) from equations 16 and 19. Hence, there is no discontinuity in equilibrium variables when pi
crosses the threshold pi∗ and investors start investing in the riskier project as well.
Investors optimize at pi∗. In addition, it is easy to show that utility is increasing at pi for pi ∈
(0,pi∗). The proof follows the same steps as in proposition 1. We, thus, need to show that there
exists a probability 0 < piL < pi∗ such that for pi< piL the individual rationality of investors violates
the participation constraint of creditors. Proposition 2 establishes this result.
Proposition 2: There exists a probability threshold piL greater than zero and lower that pi∗,
such that investors choose only the safer asset for pi ∈ [piL,pi∗ ).
See the Appendix for the proof.
Corollary 1: The rate of default, 1− v, is falling as investors become more optimistic for pi ∈(
piL,pi∗
)
, then gradually increases for pi ∈ (pi∗,piH), and finally starts falling again for pi ∈ (piH ,1).
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See the Appendix for the proof.
In the analysis above, the perceived probability of a good realization could change continuously.
However, agents are Bayesian learners and they update their beliefs in discrete intervals as new
information about payoff realizations arrives. The perceived probability of a good realization will
exhibit jumps as new information arrives. Moreover, investors can accumulate profits over time,
which affects their risk-taking behaviour and the resulting borrowing rates at each point in time. We
examine these issues in section 4 where we present a calibrated example of the dynamic model.
The following section discusses the externality induced by optimism and risk-taking in the static
framework presented above. The nature of the externality provides intuition about potential regula-
tory interventions, which are discussed in section 5 for the case of the calibrated example.
3.2 Social Planner’s Solution
The ability to default twists investors’ preferences and allows them to take on more downside risk.
As shown in the previous section, they may do so by starting to invest in the riskier project when
pi > pi∗. Consequently, they will default more. This introduces a pecuniary externality along the
lines of Stiglitz (1982) and Korinek (2011). Investors are price takers and do not take into account
the effect that their default decision has on the equilibrium borrowing rate. Once they start investing
in the riskier project, the borrowing rate can stop being a decreasing function of the probability of a
good realization (corollary 1). Investors increase their downside risk by investing more in the riskier
project and are charged with a higher rate than otherwise. Investors do not factor in the effect of
their default on borrowing rates, and thus, on aggregate default and the deadweight loss/disutility
associated with it.7
We consider a social planner who takes into account the effect of her decisions on the borrowing
rate and aggregate default. The social planner’s objective is to maximize the utility of the represen-
tative investor by choosing the level of investment, the allocation between the safer and the riskier
assets, the rate of default, as well as the borrowing rate, which in the context of the social planner’s
equilibrium should be thought as the promised return to creditors. The social planner is otherwise
constrained in her decisions by the same payoff structure, the same penalties for default and the
7The pecuniary externality does not affect creditors’ welfare in equilibrium, since they are risk-neutral and break even
in expectation. This will not be the case with risk-averse creditors.
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borrowing contract she can write with creditors, which cannot be state-contingent. The social plan-
ner will try to minimize the deadweight loss from default and she will return the whole investment
payoff to creditors in the event of a bad realization. The consumption of investors in the bad state
will, thus, be zero. Note that the social planner still defaults on creditors in the bad stare, since the
payoffs of both assets L and H are less than one and creditors demand an interest rate higher than
one to break even.
The social planner sets the return to creditors equal to Rsp =
1− (1−pi)[asp (XLd −XHd )+XHd ]
pi
,
such that they break even for any level of investment allocation, asp. This constraint should always
hold with equality and we substitute it directly into the optimization problem. Due to risk-neutral
creditors and homogeneous risk-averse investors, aggregation is easy and the social planner maxi-
mizes the utility of the representative investor, i.e.,8
max
Πspu ,wsp,asp
Usp = piΠspu − γ ·piΠspu 2−λ(1−pi)wsp
[
1− [asp (XLd −XHd )+XHd ]
pi
]
,
subject to the budget constraints
Πspu ≤ asp ·wspXLu +(1−asp) ·wspXHu −wspRsp
⇒Πspu ≤ wsp
[
asp
[
pi(XLu −XHu )+(1−pi)(XLd −XHd )
]
+piXHu +(1−pi)XHd −1
pi
]
(µspu ),
and the short-sale constraints 0≤ asp ≤ 1.
The Lagrangian which the social planner maximizes is
Lsp =piΠspu − γ ·piΠspu 2−λ(1−pi)wsp
[
1− [asp (XLd −XHd )+XHd ]
pi
]
−µspu
[
Πspu −wsp
[
asp
[
pi(XLu −XHu )+(1−pi)(XLd −XHd )
]
+piXHu +(1−pi)XHd −1
pi
]]
−φsp [asp−1]+ψsp ·asp.
8The superscript sp is used to distinguish the equilibrium values from the ones in the competitive equilibrium.
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The first order condition with respect to wsp is
µspu
[
asp
[
pi(XLu −XHu )+(1−pi)(XLd −XHd )
]
+piXHu +(1−pi)XHd −1
]
= λ(1−pi)[1−asp (XLd −XHd )−XHd ]
⇒µspu =
λ(1−pi)[1−asp (XLd −XHd )−XHd ]
asp
[
pi(XLu −XHu )+(1−pi)(XLd −XHd )
]
+piXHu +(1−pi)XHd −1
(20)
With respect to investment allocation, asp, the optimizing condition is
µspu
pi
(
XLu −XHu
)
+(1−pi)(XLd −XHd )
pi
+λ(1−pi)X
L
d −XHd
pi
− φ
sp
wsp
+
ψsp
wsp
= 0. (21)
Lemma 2: The social planner chooses to invest:
• in both assets if XHu ·XLd −XHd ·XLu = XHu −XHd − (XLu −XLd ),
• in the safer asset if XHu ·XLd −XHd ·XLu > XHu −XHd − (XLu −XLd ),
• in the riskier asset if XHu ·XLd −XHd ·XLu < XHu −XHd − (XLu −XLd ).
See the Appendix for the proof.
We turn to the solution under the assumption that XHu ·XLd −XHd ·XLu > XHu −XHd − (XLu −XLd ),
i.e., asp = 1. The analysis is equivalent for XHu ·XLd −XHd ·XLu < XHu −XHd − (XLu −XLd ). For XHu ·
XLd −XHd ·XLu = XHu −XHd − (XLu −XLd ), the equilibrium allocation, asp, is indeterminate. Thus, we
will not consider this special case of measure zero.
For asp = 1, the equilibrium level of investment wsp and the promised return to creditors are
wsp =
1
2γ
1
XLu −Rsp
(
1− µ
sp
u
pi
)
(22)
Rsp =
1− (1−pi)XLd
pi
(23)
where
µspu =
λ(1−pi)(1−XLd )
piXLu +(1−pi)XLd −1
(24)
Proposition 3: Assume that XHu ·XLd −XHd ·XLu > XHu −XHd −(XLu −XLd ). There exist probability
thresholds p¯iL and pi∗ such that:
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• Both competitive investors and the social planner invest only in the safer asset for pi ∈[
p¯iL,pi∗
]
.
• Competitive investors gradually switch their investment towards the riskier asset for pi > pi∗,
while the social planner continues investing in the safer one.
See the Appendix for the proof.
The assumption about asset payoffs is made to satisfy the creditors’ participation constraint in
the competitive equilibrium, i.e., R > 1 (see equation 9), so that we can compare the solution in the
competitive equilibrium with the social planner’s solution for the whole range of pi′s. Rsp, which is
given by equation 23, satisfies the participation constraint for pi≤ 1. The following lemmas establish
the change in equilibrium variables in the social planner’s solution.
Lemma 3: Investors consume more in the good state and less in the bad one in the social
planner’s solution compared to the competitive solution for pi ∈ (pi∗,piH).
See the Appendix for the proof.
Lemma 4: The amount of borrowing increases, whereas the borrowing and default rates de-
crease in the social planner’s solution compared to the competitive equilibrium for pi ∈ (pi∗,piH).
See the Appendix for the proof.
We now prove one of our main claims; that the competitive equilibrium is Pareto inefficient,
thus there is scope for policy intervention. We consider the cases for which pi > pi∗, i.e. a < 1.
We restrict the percentage repayment, v, and set it as an exogenous variable. Our objective is to
evaluate the change in investors’ utility for small changes in v. We maintain the equilibrium values
for consumption in the good and the bad state, and we allow the investment allocation, a, and the
level of borrowing, w, to vary in order to neutralize the effect of v on consumption. Thus, the only
effect will be on the disutility of default.
Proposition 4: In a competitive equilibrium, investors shift their portfolio towards the riskier
asset once expectations improve sufficiently. This creates an externality, since investors are price
takers and do not factor in the impact of their portfolio choices on default and credit spreads in
equilibrium. An exogenous restriction on the equilibrium level of default can result in a Pareto
improvement.
See the Appendix for the proof.
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The proposition above showed that an exogenous decrease in the level of default can result
in a Pareto improvement given that creditors are risk-neutral and break even in expectation. We
proved this by keeping the level of consumption constant and varying the level and the allocation
of investment. However, in the social planner’s solution the level of consumption will be different
from the competitive equilibrium levels as shown in lemma 3. Figure 2 reports the welfare gains in
the social planner’s solution measured as the compensating variations in terms of profits.9 We have
parameterized the model by setting XLu = 1.4, X
L
d = 0.8, X
H
u = 2.1, X
H
d = 0.2, λ= 0.9 and γ= 0.035.
The parameters are such that the social planner chooses asp = 1 (lemma 2). The social planner’s
solution strictly dominates the competitive solution even for pi< pi∗ where there is only investment
in the safer asset for both. The reason is that the social planner takes into consideration her impact
on the deadweight loss and minimizes it. We also report the welfare gains when the social planner
chooses the riskier asset to demonstrate that it is Pareto dominated.
Figure 2: Welfare gains in social planner’s solutions versus the probability of a good realization
9The figure shows the constant fraction of profits, η, at each date, and state that investors would need to be paid
(or forgo) to get the same utility they would obtain in the social planner’s solution. η is the solution to equation
∑
t
Et
[
Π∗t+1 (1+η)− γ ·
(
Π∗t+1 (1+η)
)2−λ[(1− v∗t+1)w∗t (1+ r∗t ),0]]= U, where the superscript ∗ denotes the equilib-
rium values in the competitive solution and U is the equilibrium level of utility for the social planner.
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3.3 Externality from Optimism
The planner corrects for the externality that arises because investors do not take into account the
impact of their default decision or portfolio allocation on the equilibrium borrowing rate and hence
they tend to default too much and take excessive risk. The welfare gains presented above come
from eliminating this externality. The planner is assumed to be imperfectly informed like investors.
Hence, the planner eliminates the excessive risk-taking given the prevailing beliefs about the state
of the world.
This risk-taking externality is present without incomplete information and learning as well. The
fundamental question is whether optimism as a result of learning exacerbates the risk-taking exter-
nality and leads to even higher excessive risk. To answer this question we look at the wedge between
the optimality conditions of investors and the planner. We show that the wedge does not depend only
on the usual distortion arising from risk taking, but there is also a component that depends on the
level of optimism measured by the portfolio loading on the riskier asset (lemma 1 establishes that a
is a decreasing function of the good state’s subjective probability).This has important policy impli-
cations, since the planner would need distinct tools to correct for both externalities associated with
excessive risk-taking; the one emanating from endogenous default and endogenous borrowing rates
and the other arising from optimism.
Given lemma 2, the optimality condition with respect to borrowing for the planner (equation
20) is written as:
µspu
[
piXLu +(1−pi)XLd −1
]
+λ(1−pi)(XLd −1)= 0 (25)
Let us now consider the competitive economy. Solving for v from the budget constraint in the
down state and substituting in equation 20 we derive:
R =
1− (1−pi)
[
a
(
XLd −XHd
)
+XHd − Πdw
]
pi
Moreover, substituting the previous in the optimality condition 7 and using equation 5, we conclude:
µu
[
piXLu +(1−pi)XLd −1
]
+λ(1−pi)(XLd −1)
− (1−pi) [µu+(1−pi)λ]Πdw − (1−a)
[
µu ·pi
(
XLu −XHu
)
+(µu+λ)(1−pi)
(
XLd −XHd
)]
= 0 (26)
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As compared with the optimality condition 25 of the planner, equation 26 is distorted in two
ways. The first distortion is caused by the term (1−pi) [µu+(1−pi)λ]Πdw and is associated with
the excessive risk-taking because investors do not internalize the borrowing rate and the cost of
default in their decisions. The second distortion is generated by investors when they start in-
vesting in the riskier asset as they become more optimistic. This in turn introduces a wedge
(1− a)[µu ·pi(XLu −XHu )+(µu+λ)(1−pi)(XLd −XHd )] in the optimality condition. Similarly, we
can consider the two regions for good state’s subjective probability defined in proposition 3. For
pi ∈ [p¯iL,pi∗], the last term in equation 26 cancels out. The planner can decentralize her solution
by imposing default penalties such that Πd = (1−λ)/(2γ) equals zero. Put differently, the default
penalty can be adjusted so that investors fully internalize the risk-taking externality.
We hasten to add that this is not the case when optimism results in excessive risk-taking, i.e., for
pi> pi∗. We see from equation 28 in the Appendix, that a can be less than 1 even for default penalties
that eliminate the aforementioned externatility (i.e., λ = 1). In particular, for the parametrization
used in figure 2,
∂a
∂λ
< 0, which means that whenever the planner increases the default penalty
she exacerbates the externality stemming from optimism and its effect on risk-taking. Section 5
presents how regulation can change economic outcomes and what types of regulation result in a
Pareto improvement using a calibrated example of our economy described in the following section.
The upshot of the argument is that the two externalities generated by default and optimism are
not “collinear", or reinforcing each other in an identical fashion, and, hence, different policy tools
are warranted to account for them.
4 Calibrated example
In this section, we calibrate the model to match some key characteristics of the period leading up to
the subprime crisis of 2007-2008.10 During this period financial institutions were increasing their
holdings of high-risk mortgage-backed financial products, which promised a higher return if market
conditions did not considerably deteriorate. However, elements of a crisis started to become visible
during 2007 as delinquencies increased. In the first half of 2007 a number of institutions continued
10Our model is not specific to this crisis episode and can be used to study the connection between optimism, risk-taking
and financial stability in other cases, such as the U.S. dot-com bubble in the end of the 20th century, or the Spanish/Irish
housing crisis recently. We choose the subprime crisis because of its importance in the Great Recession that followed and
because of the data availability to calibrate our model.
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to increase their holdings of mortgage backed securities (MBS) and the stock market was improving
until the end of July 2007. The events that unfolded after August 2007, including the collapse of
two hedge funds of Bear Stearns, resulted in widespread distress in financial markets, big losses
through the course of 2008 and an economic recession.
In terms of our model, the period of low volatility and sustainable growth until the summer of
2007 corresponds to realizations of good states of the world, which induce agents to improve their
expectations given that it is more probable to be in the higher growth regime where the probability
of a good realization is θ1.11 On the contrary, the events that unfolded thereafter and throughout
2008 correspond to bad realizations, which increase the weight put of the low growth regime θ2
in forming expectations and most importantly result in losses and potentially default for levered
financial institutions. We set the transition probabilities for high- and low-growth states, θ1 and θ2,
to 0.98 and 0.48 respectively following Checchetti et al. (2000) and Cogley and Sargent (2008). We
will calibrate the prior belief, Pr(θ= θ1), to match the initial portfolio holdings of the riskier asset
observed in the data as discussed below.
Our objective is not to match the data over a long period, but rather to examine whether op-
timistic expectations can account for the increase in MBS held by financial institutions before the
crisis and compute how the implied default rates evolve. Our model draws the distinction between
realized and implied default rates during times of optimism. Default rates are low (or zero given that
we consider two states of the world) during boom periods when optimism builds and, then, jump
after the realization of bad news. This is consistent with our model, where realized low default
rates result in optimism and excessive risk-taking. Should a bad shock realize, default is much more
severe as suggested by the implied default rates at each point in time. We, thus, consider a three
period version of our model where the first period corresponds to 2006, the second to 2007 and
the third to 2008. The year of 2006 was a period of low volatility and low default rates. Financial
institutions started increasing their holdings of MBS compared to other assets classes. Good market
conditions and optimism continued in 2007 and financial institutions increased their holdings of
MBS even further. The first signs of market slowdown appeared in August 2007 and became more
11Figure 8 in the Appendix reports the VIX index for the period leading up to the crisis. Market volatility was at
historical low levels before the crisis and jumps quickly thereafter. We discuss in the conclusions how our model can gen-
erate this “volatility" paradox, which is also analyzed in Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2014).
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apparent in 2008 leading to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In terms of our
model, the year 2007 corresponds to a good state realization and the year 2008 to a bad one. We will
further assume that investors consume their private benefit in the case that the bad shock is realized
in the second period and they chose to default, i.e. we will not consider the investment decisions
that would have followed a bad realization in the second period. The reason is that we want to focus
on paths present in the data and restrict ourself in calibrating the model. The model would allow for
higher risk-taking if we considered additional paths, because the continuation value at the bad state
in the second period would be higher.
We choose the riskier and safer holdings as well as the leverage to match the balance sheet
of broker dealers’ over this period taken from the U.S. Flow of Funds data. We choose broker
dealers to represent investors in our model for two main reasons. First, broker dealers adjust their
balance sheet faster and more dynamically when news arrive, as documented by Adrian and Shin
(2009). Second, the returns for the asset classes they invest in can be computed by publicly available
macro-level data. This exercise would be more complicated if we considered traditional banking
institutions, because a large portion of their assets consists of bank specific loans for which data are
not publicly available.
Since we consider a representative investor, we use aggregate asset holdings and liabilities for
broker dealers. Table 1 shows the aggregate balance sheet of broker dealers for 2006 and 2007. The
total financial assets are divided in five main categories: 1) cash, 2) credit market instruments, 3)
equities, 4) security credit, and, 5) miscellaneous assets.
The credit market instruments and the equities on the asset side of the balance sheet provide
information about the investment strategies of broker dealers, while the data on miscellaneous assets
provide a proxy for investments by broker-dealer clients via their cash collateral positions (see
Adrian et al. (2013) for a discussion of broker dealers’ asset portfolios). Broker dealers holdings of
MBS are assumed to correspond to investment in the riskier asset, wHt ; while all other asset holdings
(equities and remaining credit market instruments), which presumably correspond to a diversified
portfolio, will capture the investment in the safer asset, wLt .
12 In the rest of the section, we describe
how we compute the portfolio holdings of riskier and safer assets, as well as leverage, to match the
12We also exclude syndicated loans because of lack of data for their returns. This does not bias our analysis given that
syndicated loans are a very small part of broker dealers’ balance sheet.
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Table 1: Assets & Liabilities of Security Brokers and Dealers as of the end of Q4/2006 and Q4/2007.
The amounts are in billion of dollars, not seasonally adjusted (Source: U.S. Flow of Funds)
2006 2007
Total Financial Assets
Checkable deposits and currency 80.5 105.0
Credit market instruments 583.4 803.1
-Open market paper 64.3 87.1
-Treasury securities -67.0 -85.0
-Agency- and GSE-backed securities 138.0 315.2
-Municipal securities and loans 50.9 50.1
-Corporate and foreign bonds 355.5 382.8
-Syndicated loans to nonfinancial corporate business 41.7 52.8
Equities 186.4 224.8
Security credit 292.1 325.5
Miscellaneous assets 1599.4 1633.7
Total liabilities and equity 2765.6 3131.3
Total liabilities 2669.1 3019.4
Equity 96.6 111.9
Leverage 28.6 28.0
data, and how we calibrate the remaining parameters in the model, which are the prior belief in the
initial period, Pr(θ= θ1), the initial equity capital, w¯0, the function f (·), the default penalty, λ, the
risk-aversion coefficient, γ, and the outside option of creditors, routside. We conclude by discussing
the model predictions for the remaining endogenous variables.
Holdings of MBS by broker dealers are not broken-out separately in the Flow of Funds data,
and are included in the "Agency- and GSE-backed securities" category. Following Greenlaw et al.
(2008), we estimate the broker dealers’ MBS holdings by extrapolating from the asset-backed se-
curities in their balance sheet and the share of MBS in the total amount of outstanding asset-backed
securities, which is available in the Flow of Funds. In particular, MBS were 57% and 60% of the
total asset-backed securities in 2006 and 2007, respectively.
Table 2 shows the holdings for each asset class as a percentage of total investment in equities
and credit market instruments in 2006 and 2007, together with the calibrated payoffs for a good and
a bad state realization. We calibrate the payoffs for fixed-income instruments to their average yield
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over the preceding year, i.e. for the payoff in the good state (realized in 2007) we average monthly
yields in 2006 and for the payoff in the bad state (realized in 2008) we use the 2007 monthly yield.
For corporate and foreign bonds we take the average yield between AAA and BAA bonds taken
from the FRED database. The three-month T-bill rate is used to calibrate the payoffs of treasury
securities, while the payoffs on the open market paper holdings are calibrated using the 60-Day AA
Financial Commercial Paper Interest Rate (both taken from FRED). We use the average of 2, 5, and
10 year Fannie Mae constant maturity par-yield to calibrate the payoffs on asset-backed securities
other than MBS, while the Bond Buyer Go 20-Bond Municipal Bond Index, which uses 20 general
obligation bonds with 20 year maturities and arithmetic average Moody’s rating of A1, is used for
municipal securities and loans (taken from Bloomberg).
The payoff of MBS in the good state is calibrated to the average 30-Year conventional mortgage
rate (taken from FRED). The bad state in this calibrated example corresponds to the increased
mortgage defaults and the drop in the market value of MBS, which induced considerable losses on
leveraged institutions. We follow Greenlaw et al. (2008) and calibrate the payoff of MBS in the bad
state of the world to match the drop in ABX index.13 We use the ABX prices on June 11th, 2008,
which was the lowest point for the S&P 500 before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. We want to
exclude this event from our analysis, because it can be considered as an additional bad shock and
because other mechanisms not present in our model, such as fire-sales dynamics, were potentially
operating. We use the realized return on the S&P 500 index from January to June 11th, 2008 to
calibrate the payoff on equity holdings in the bad state of the world, while the payoff in the good
state is set to the realized return over 2007.
MBS will capture the investment in the riskier asset in our model, while the portfolio of the
remaining assets will be used as a proxy for the safer asset. The payoffs for the safer asset are
computed as the value-weighted average of the payoffs of the individual asset classes. Using these
13The Markit.com’s ABX index represents a basket of credit default swaps linked to subprime mortgages. The indices
are constructed by pooling mortgages with similar (initial) credit ratings. ABX indices differ by vintage and credit ratings.
We will consider a weighted average of the five separate ABX indices based on the rating of the underlying security, from
AAA to BBB-. We use the same weights as in Greenlaw et al. (2008), which rely on analysis from Moody’s that maps
subprime originations into a distribution of mortgage-backed securities with various credit ratings. In particular, 80.8%
of all (subprime) mortgages are AAA, 9.6% are AA, 5.0% are A, 3.5% are BBB and 1.1% are BBB-. Finally, we will use
the ABX 06-01 indices, which were launched in January 2006 and covered mortgages originated in 2005. These yield
a weighted value of 0.79 or equivalently a 21% loss. If we additionally used the ABX 06-02 and ABX 07-01 indices
for subsequent vintages the calibrated payoff would be 0.63, which would result in higher defaults and would require a
higher degree of optimism to explain the actual holdings of MBS by broker dealers.
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Table 2: % portfolio holdings and payoffs by asset class
% holdings % holdings Payoff in Payoff in
in 2006 in 2007 good state bad state
MBS 9.73% 17.51% 1.0641 0.7850
Rest of portfolio 90.27% 82.49% 1.0481 0.9927
-Checkable deposits and currency 9.95% 9.72% 1.0000 1.0000
-Open market paper 7.95% 8.07% 0.0795 0.0807
-Treasury securities -8.29% -7.87% 1.0473 1.0435
-Other asset-backed securities 7.34% 11.67% 1.0510 1.0488
-Municipal securities and loans 6.29% 4.64% 1.0440 1.0440
-Corporate and foreign bonds 43.97% 35.44% 1.0603 1.0602
- Equities 23.05% 20.81% 1.0443 0.8376
data, the model yields borrowing rates of 4.4% for the first and second period using equation 9,
which is lower than the average 3-Month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) during 2006 and
2007 (5.20% and 5.30%). We later evaluate the model predictions about the spread between the
borrowing rate and the outside option of creditors by comparing it to the LIB-OIS spread, which is
the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the overnight index swap (OIS). Gorton and Metrick
(2012) also use the LIB-OIS spread as a proxy for fears about financial institutions solvency.
The effective equity capital invested in the asset classes in table 2 can be approximated by
dividing their total dollar amount by the leverage of broker dealers in 2006, shown in table 1, and
is equal to 28.2 bn dollars. We rescale this amount and set the initial capital of investors w¯0 = 0.3.
Given the initial capital, we compute the amount of total assets and investment in each asset class
in the first period by using the leverage ratio from table 1 and the percentage holdings from table 2.
Similarly, we compute the effective equity capital, total assets and investment by asset class in the
second period using the respective ratios for 2007.
We set the following parameters, which are the prior of investors in the initial period, the risk-
aversion coefficient, the default penalty, the function transforming retained earnings to available
funds for investment, and the outside option of creditors, such that the model matches the investment
in the riskier and safer assets in the initial and the second period, as well as the equity capital in
the second period, which are observed in the data.14 Table 3 below shows the calibrated parameter
14We assume that the function that transforms retained earnings to reinvested funds is f (x) = δ ·√x and we calibrate
the parameter δ.
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values as well as the portfolio allocations that we match to the data.
Table 3: Calibrated example
Calibrated parameters Model predictions
θ1 0.980 pi0 0.968
θ2 0.480 piu 0.974
Pr(θ= θ1) 0.975 r0 0.044
γ 0.700 ru 0.044
λ 0.843 Πuu 0.505
δ 0.683 Πud 0.112
XLg 1.048 Πd 0.112
XLb 0.993 w0 8.292
XHg 1.064 wu 11.030
XHb 0.785 vd 0.952
Endogenous variables vuu 1.000
matched to data vud 0.941
w¯0 0.300 LGDd 0.414
wL0 7.756 LGDud 0.682
wH0 0.836 r− routside 16bps
f (Iu) 0.410 E0(v1) 0.998
wLu 9.468 Eu(v2) 0.998
wHu 1.973
Given this parameterization, our model makes the following predictions. The percentage default
rate, 1− vd is 0.05 if the bad state occurs in the second period. The default rate is higher than this,
at 1− vud = 0.06, when the bad state occurs in the final period following a previous good realiza-
tion. This is due to the fact that investors increase their holdings of the riskier asset in the second
period given that expectations are updated upward (piu > pi0). This risk-taking is accompanied by
higher borrowing, which results in much higher loss given default. However, creditors are willing to
increase their lending to investors because their expectations are also updated upwards as indicated
by the fact that expected percentage default is the same in the initial period and in the second period
where the good state of the world realizes. Moreover, the model predicts a credit spread of 16 basis
point, which is close to the steady value of 10 basis points for the LIBOR-OIS spread before the be-
ginning of the crisis. Our analysis suggests that low expected default rates and credit spreads during
good times are consistent with higher risk-taking and higher ex-post default when a bad shock hits.
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As we argue in section 3.3, optimism induces an externality which results in excessive risk-
taking over and beyond to what would be expected with just the limited liability assumption. The
next section consider the calibrated economy described above and examines the ability of regulatory
interventions to mitigate this externality and increase welfare.
5 Policy Responses
The driving force behind an increase in borrowing and increased risk taking is the optimism that
comes after the realization of good news. The expectations formation mechanism is exogenous
in our model and is implemented through Bayesian updating. Agents have imperfect information
about the real world probability of a good state occurring and they try to infer it by observing past
realizations. They are Bayesian learners. There is also no additional asymmetry of information.
Every agent knows and observes the same information. Thus, regulation cannot control optimism in
the markets. Agents are rational and none have more information than others. Regulation cannot af-
fect optimism, but it can control its consequences by affecting the incentives and ability of investors
to take on risk. Simplified as it is, our model can be used to evaluate regulatory policies to control
borrowing and mitigate excessive risk-taking and default. The purpose of regulation is not to elimi-
nate risk-taking altogether, but to discourage investors from taking excessive risk due to optimistic
expectations. A first type of policy is to enforce more severe default penalties for investors, while
a second is to control their leverage ratios. Finally, the regulator could impose direct limits on the
amount of safer-to-riskier investment. We use the equilibrium outcomes calculated in section 4 to
evaluate the effect of policy interventions on equilibrium variables and welfare.
The social planner’s solution (see section 3.2) suggests that there can exist policy interventions
which increase the welfare of investors, while not affecting creditors’ welfare. The competitive
equilibrium is Pareto suboptimal. We have shown in lemmas 3 and 4 that consumption is higher in
the good and lower in the bad state in the social planner’s solution, while the amount of borrowing
is higher than in the competitive equilibrium. These equilibrium variables do not move in the same
way as in the social planner’s solution when stricter default penalties and leverage ratios are imposed
in the competitive equilibrium (sections 5.1 and 5.2 respectively). Although they are successful in
reducing borrowing and loss given default, they result in lower welfare for investors, while not
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changing the welfare of the creditors. We, thus, construct a different regulatory ratio, which better
captures the social planner’s solution. This policy ratio is equal to safer minus riskier holdings per
unit of borrowing and captures the excessive risk-taking for leveraged investors. Imposing a stricter
regulatory threshold for this ratio results in lower risk-taking and higher welfare. We discuss in sec-
tion 5.3 how such a tool differs from risk-weighted capital regulation. Figure 3 presents the welfare
gains/losses over the unregulated competitive equilibrium, measured as the compensating variations
in terms of profit (η), for higher default penalties, stricter leverage requirements and stricter values
for the regulatory ratio we propose (see footnote 9 for a definition of η).
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Figure 3: Regulation and Welfare: Compensating variations in terms of profit
5.1 Stricter Default Penalties
A way to correct for the risk-taking externality could be to make default more costly by setting a
higher default penalty.15 We argued in section 3.3 that such a policy would exacerbate the excessive
15Given limited liability, direct ways for the legal system or regulation to affect these penalties are lengthy bankruptcy
processes or time-consuming investigations to discover fraudulent behaviour, in which case default penalties are higher
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risk-taking due to optimistic expectations. In this section we discuss the mechanism through which
higher default penalties operate using the calibrated economy as the benchmark equilibrium. Figure
4 in the Appendix reports the changes in selected endogenous variables as we increase the default
penalty from its calibrated value to a value of one, which is the maximum value such that profits in
the default states are positive (recall that the latter are given by (1−λ)/2γ).
The first order effect of increasing the default penalty would be a reduction in borrowing and
lower profits in the default states, d and ud. The fact that investors are discouraged to leverage up
as much as before also results in lower profits when the good state realizes in the final period. This
creates an adverse effect whereby investors switch their portfolio holdings towards the riskier asset
in both the initial and the second period to compensate for the loss in profits due to lower leverage.
The reason for this risk-shifting is that the borrowing rate continues to be determined by equation
9 and, thus, investors are not penalized ex-ante with higher borrowing costs which would diminish
the profit margin in state uu. Harsher penalties are effective in reducing the loss given default due
to optimistic expectations, but they are doing so by discouraging borrowing rather than mitigating
excessive risk-taking. They reduce profits in all states and they result in lower welfare (figure 3
above).
5.2 Leverage Requirements
Another policy response would be to restrict leverage, which is defined by
wLt +w
H
t
f (It)
at each point
in time. In our calibration, leverage is slightly higher in the initial period than in the good state
in the second period (table 1). Thus, a time invariant leverage requirement would bind in both
periods. The first-order effects of this regulation is to reduce borrowing in both periods, which
can be balanced by an increase in own funds invested. However, a leverage requirement does not
distinguish between the safer and the riskier projects, and the optimal portfolio decision continues
to yield µuu =
XLd −XHd
XHu −XLu
µud . Given that the default penalty is the same, µud does not change with
leverage requirements and, thus, investors are optimizing to maintain the same level of consumption
in state uu. Since the ability to borrow is lower, this requires that the reinvested funds in the second
due to legal sanctions. Regulation can affect this component of default penalties and make default more costly during
good times. An alternative way to impose penalties in a more quantifiable way is through renumeration reforms involving
deferred managerial compensation, which would allow clawback of accrued past bonuses in the case of bad outcomes
and default.
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period increase or that investors deleverage internally by substituting the safer asset with the riskier
one. Figure 5 shows how investment in the safer asset goes down together with the amount of
borrowing, while at the same time riskier asset holdings increase in both periods. Since the leverage
requirements binds in the initial period as well, investors will risk-shift in order to increase the
reinvested profits in the second period and make up for the reduction in gearing. This results in
higher default when a bad shock realized and the loss given default in state ud goes up, which result
in lower welfare (figure 3 above).
The capital requirements in the Basel Accords try to avoid such a situation by imposing require-
ments on equity capital in relation to risk-weighted assets. The idea is that the capital requirement
becomes tighter if banks invest in riskier assets. Both Basel I and II regulation have the feature that
equity capital is higher after good realizations due to the higher returns from previous investments.
However, when expectations become more optimistic, risk-weights based on internal models de-
crease and, hence, capital requirements are less likely to bind. This is true for both safer and riskier
assets. Section 5.3 below discusses this drawback of risk-weighted capital requirement and exam-
ines a type of regulation that could tackle the externalities from optimism and excessive risk-taking
more directly.
5.3 An alternative requirement
As expectations become more optimistic, investors switch towards the riskier investment. As shown
in section 3.3, this creates an externality leading to excessive default relative to the social optimum,
since investors do not factor in the impact that a riskier portfolio has on default. It is also true that
higher investment in the safer asset and borrowing are desirable when the prospects of the economy
improve (lemma 4). Regulation can provide incentives to investors to behave in a socially optimal
way by restricting the level of borrowing that is shifted from safer to riskier investment. Such a
requirement can be specified in variety of ways. Herein, we consider a requirement that is equal to
the difference between safer and riskier holdings per unit of borrowed funds, i.e.,
wLu−wHu ≥ ζ ·w, (27)
33
where ζ is the regulatory requirement.16
Stricter requirements of this type result in lower borrowing costs in the second period and a
lower rate of default in state ud, since investors reduce their investment in the riskier asset (figure
6 in the Appendix). Moreover, this kind of regulation provides incentives to increase investment
in the safer asset, in contrast to leverage regulation whereby investors would reduce borrowing
and de-lever internally. Affecting behaviour in a way that resembles the social planner’s solution,
the regulatory constraint in equation 27 results in higher borrowing, but lower deadweight loss
from default (LGDud decreases). In contrast to the prior types of regulation, this one addresses the
externality from excessive risk-taking due to optimism more successfully and results in an increase
in welfare (figure 3).
This type of regulation can be used as a countercyclical tool, because it will first bind when
expectations become more optimistic and the relative investment in riskier projects goes up. De-
pending on the level on the regulatory minimum ζ it can discourage excessive risk-taking behavior
in the early or later stages of the boom period during which expectations improve.
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
The perceived risk profile of investment opportunities changes over time. Agents are Bayesian
learners and update their beliefs about future realisations by observing the sequence of past ones.
After a prolonged period of good news, expectations are boosted and investors find it profitable
to shift their portfolios towards projects that are on average riskier, but promise higher expected
returns. Creditors are willing to provide them with funds, since their expectations have improved
as well. Consequently, the level of borrowing increases, risk premia do not increase and portfolios
16Basel II capital requirements are inadequate for this task, since (internal) model based risk-weights go down during
good times (Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2005) and Pederzoli et al. (2010)). Figure 9 in the Appendix presents average risk
weights, calculated as the ratio of the aggregate risk weighted assets over aggregate assets, for a panel of 33 international
big banks. The panel includes the National Bank of Australia, ANZ, Macquarie, Dexia, China Merchants Bank, BNP
Paribas, Credit Agricole, Societe Generale, Natixis, Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Unicredit, Monte dei Paschi, ING,
Santander, BBVA, Nordea, SEB, Svenska Handelsbanken, UBS, Credit Suisse, Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays, HSBC,
Lloyds, Standard Charted, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Bank of NY Mellon, State Street
and PNC. Source: Bloomberg. Our proposal results in lower risk-taking accompanied by higher borrowing and higher
investment in safer projects. Although relative risk is sometimes not accurately measured, for example when the top
tranches of CDOs and MBSs were given too high a rating before the 2007 financial crisis, so that banks which were
subject to an RWA, but not a leverage ratio, tended to expand their leverage enormously on the basis of such supposedly
risk-free assets, which were not so. To account for such circumstances, our proposal could be augmented by a leverage
restriction, in order not only to mitigate risk-taking, but also to reduce investment in projects that are mistakenly perceived
to be safer.
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comprise of relatively riskier projects. When bad news does occur, default is higher than it would
otherwise be and the consequences for financial stability are more severe. This creates an externality,
since investors do not take into account the level of default when making their portfolio decisions.
We examine three regulatory tools to correct for the inefficiency caused by optimism and leverage,
which are stricter default penalties for default, tighter leverage requirements and a novel criterion
capturing the relative risk-taking per unit of borrowed funds. Our results suggest that only the latter
results in a Pareto improvement.
Our analysis has empirical implications for the identification of points in the leverage cycle
where there is a higher risk of future financial instability. In particular, we have constructed a
theoretical model to highlight the variables that can potentially be used to develop an index, which
could act as a leading indicator for financial distress. In our framework, as expectations become
more optimistic due to good realizations, investors start investing in riskier projects and increase
their borrowing. Although the loss given default increases under a riskier portfolio composition,
expected default and credit spreads do not adjust commensurately. Thus, not only credit growth, but
also portfolio switches to riskier projects should be used to identify the point in the leverage cycle
in conjunction with low (ex-ante) risk premia.
An important element of the identification strategy would be expectations formation. The effec-
tiveness of capturing time-varying transition probabilities between good and bad regimes should be
the main objective in model selection for empirical work. One of the conjectures to be tested is that
the riskiness of the financial system increases as people become more optimistic.
Measuring the riskiness of financial portfolios over the leverage cycle is not an easy task. As
has been highlighted in this paper, although investors engage in riskier behavior after a period of
good realizations, this results from expectations becoming more optimistic. The commonly used
measures to capture risk build-up, such as the volatility of returns on assets or credit spreads, fail
to do so due to the fact that they are biased by optimistic expectations. It is evident that market
volatility as measured by the VIX index was below its long-term trend before the financial crisis.
The same holds for the TED spread (figure 8 in the Appendix).17
The index, which we propose, is the difference between safer and riskier portfolio holdings per
17Various other indicators, such as credit growth to GDP or housing prices growth, have been proposed in the literature.
For a broad overview that differentiates between system-wide and bank-specific variables, see Drehmann et al. (2010).
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unit of leverage. Once expectations become optimistic riskier projects are perceived to be less risky;
the same holds for safer ones, which are assessed as being even more safe. Although absolute risk-
iness goes down for both types their ranking is (as assumed) preserved. For example risk weighted
assets (RWA) as defined by the Basel Accord II, under which risk weights follow an Internal Ratings
Basel (IRB) approach and change over the cycle. We hasten to add that the literature on procycli-
cality has shown that all risk weights go down in good times, as empirical data also suggest (figure
9 in the Appendix). Thus, RWA do not increase as much as they should when banks shift their
portfolio towards projects previously regarded as too risky. This procyclicality in measured risk is
mitigated once we focus on the difference between projects with a lower and higher risk-weights,
assuming that their relative rankings are preserved. Finally, we normalize by leverage, because it
is default on debt that causes a financial crisis, a tightening of credit and forced liquidations. In
figure 7 in the Appendix, we simulate our model for different levels of optimism and show how the
proposed index can predict risk-taking and financial instability, whereas the more commonly used
volatility measures fails. As a proxy for VIX we calculate the volatility of banking portfolios, which
instead moves in the opposite direction. Our analysis suggests that quantity based measures, which
capture the risk-taking behaviour of leveraged investors, could be valuable as leading indicators for
subsequent financial instability.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. It suffices to show that ∂a/∂pi< 0. After substituting, equation 13 becomes
a =
(XHu −R)(1−λ)− (XHd − 1−piR1−pi )
(
1− 1−pipi A¯λ
)
(XLd −XHd )
(
1− 1−pipi A¯λ
)− (XLu −XHu )(1−λ) , (28)
where A¯ =
XLd −XHd
XHu −XLu
> 0. The gross rate R is fixed by equation 9 and is greater than 1. Also, we
choose λ≤ 1, otherwise agents would never choose to default as they are on-the-verge of defaulting
when λ= (1−2γΠd). The second term in the numerator is increasing with pi, thus the numerator is
decreasing. Moreover, the first term in the denominator is increasing in pi, thus the denominator is
increasing. Combining the two we get that ∂a/∂pi< 0.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. From lemma 1 we know that ∂a(pi)/∂pi< 0. Also, a(pi) is a continuous function of pi for 0 <
pi< 1. We need to show that there exist pi
′
and pi
′′
, where pi
′
< pi
′′
, such that a(pi
′
)> 1 and a(pi
′′
)< 1.
Then, by the intermediate value theorem there exists pi∗, pi
′
< pi∗< pi
′′
, such that a(pi∗) = 1. The limit
of a(pi) as pi→ 0 is lim
pi→0
a(pi) = lim
pi→0
1−XHd
XLd −XHd
+
pi2
(1−pi)2
1−R
(XLd −XHd )A¯λ
=
1−XHd
XLd −XHd
> 1 given that
0 < XHd < X
L
d < 1. Also, limpi→1
a(pi) =−∞ given that R > 1. The probability pi∗(XLd ,XLu ,XHd ,XHu ,λ) is
given by setting equation 28 equal to 1 and solving for pi∗.
In order to prove that piH < 1, we just need to show that a(pi) crosses zero for piH as pi goes from
pi∗ to one, since a(pi∗) = 1 and a(pi) is continuous and decreasing. The RHS of 28 as pi→ 1 goes to
−∞. Thus, there exists a threshold piH greater than pi∗ and lower than one, such that the short sales
constraint a ≥ 0 is hit. For pi > piH the complementary slackness condition implies that a = 0 and
ψ> 0. The probability piH(XLd ,X
L
u ,X
H
d ,X
H
u ,λ) is given by setting equation 28 equal to 0 and solving
for piH .
To complete the proof, we need to show that investors do actually prefer the riskier asset for
pi ∈ [piH ,1] over their outside option, which is zero investment and borrowing yielding a utility
value of zero. We first show that the equilibrium variables are continuous at piH as investors choose
a = 0. For pi> piH the solution for the amount of borrowing, the borrowing rate and the percentage
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default are given by
XHu −R
XHd − 1−piR1−pi
=
1− 1−pipi
R−XHd
XHu −Rλ
1−λ , (29)
pi
1−pi
1−2γw(XHu −R)
λ
=
R−XHd
XHu −R
, (30)
R =
1
pi+(1−pi)v . (31)
We evaluate these conditions as pi approaches piH from the left (denoted by piH−) and compare them
with those as pi goes to piH from the right (denoted by piH+). In the former region, investors invest
in both assets, but as pi→ piH−, a→ 0. The equivalent of equations 29 and 30 as pi→ piH− are
XHu −R
XHd − 1−piR1−pi
=
1− 1−pipi
XLd−XHd
XHu −XLu λ
1−λ (32)
and
pi
1−pi
1−2γw(XHu −R)
λ
=
XHd −XLd
XLu −XHu
. (33)
Evaluating the first order conditions 7 and 8 as pi→ piH− we get that X
L
d −XHd
XHu −XLu
approaches
R(piH−)−XHd
XHu −R(piH−)
.
From equations 29 and 32 we get that R(piH+) = R(piH−). Also, v(piH+) = v(piH−) and w(piH+) =
w(piH−) from equations 30 and 33. Hence, there is no discontinuity in equilibrium variables when
pi crosses the threshold piH and investors choose only the riskier asset.
Investors optimize at piH . Given the continuity in equilibrium variables it suffices to show that
investors’ utility is increasing as the probability pi goes from piH to one. The deadweight loss from
defaulting in the bad state, (1−pi)(1−v)λwR, can be written as λw(R−1) given that v= 1−piR
R(1−pi) .
Investors utility can be written as
U = pi
(
Πu− γΠ2u
)
+(1−pi)(Πd− γΠ2d)−λw(R−1). (34)
Its derivative with respect to pi is
∂U
∂pi
=Πu− γΠ2u+pi(1−2γΠu)
∂Πu
∂pi
− (Πd− γΠ2d)−λ∂(w(R−1))∂pi , (35)
since Πd is fixed at
1−λ
2γ
. Moreover, Πu >Πd , since investors do not default in the good state, and
pi(1−2γΠu) = µu > 0. To evaluate ∂Πu∂pi , we will use equation 7 for a = 0 and the derivative of R
with respect to pi.
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For pi> piH , total differentiate equation 29 and recall that vR =
1−piR
1−pi . Then, we get
−dR(1−λ) =−dvR+λXHd
1
pi2
dR
[
(R−XHd )+(XHu −R)
(XHu −R)2
]
+dvR
1−pi
pi
R−XHd
XHu −R
λ− vRλ 1
pi2
dR
[
(R−XHd )+(XHu −R)
(XHu −R)2
]
⇒ dR
[
1−λ+ pi
(1−pi)2 +λ
1
pi2
(XHd − vR)
[
(R−XHd )+(XHu −R)
(XHu −R)2
]]
=−
[
1− 1−pi
pi
R−XHu
XHu −R
λ
]
.
Thus, dR/dpi < 0 for pi > piH . Thus, equation µu
(
XHu −R
)
+ µd
(
XLu −R
)
= 0 implies that
∂µu
∂pi
=
∂(pi(1−2γΠu))
∂pi
< 0⇒ ∂Πu
∂pi
>
1−2γΠu
2γpi
> 0. Finally, w =
1−λ
2γ
1
XHd − 1−piR1−pi
, thus
∂(w(R−1))
∂pi
=
1−λ
2γ
(
XHd − 1−piR1−pi
)− (R−1) pi1−pi(
XHd − 1−piR1−pi
)2 = XHd −1(
XHd − 1−piR1−pi
)2 < 0. Combining the above we get that investors
utility is increasing at pi, for pi> piH .
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The optimizing behaviour of investors yields equation 7, which, for a = 1, becomes
µu
(
XLu −R
)
+µd
(
XLd −R
)
= 0⇒ R = µuX
L
u +µdX
L
d
µu+µd
The participation constraint of the creditors requires R > 1, thus
µu
µu+µd
XLu +
µd
µu+µd
XLd > 1 or
piu′(Πu)
piu′(Πu)+(1−pi)u′(Πd)X
L
u +
(1−pi)u′(Πd)
piu′(Πu)+(1−pi)u′(Πd)X
L
d > 1. (36)
Investors optimize when consumption in the good state is higher than in the bad one otherwise
they would default in the good state as well. This implies that
piu′(Πu)
piu′(Πu)+(1−pi)u′(Πd) < pi and
(1−pi)u′(Πd)
piu′(Πu)+(1−pi)u′(Πd) > (1−pi). Thus, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for inequality
36 to hold is
piXLu +(1−pi)XLd > 1⇒ pi>
1−XLd
XLu −XLd
. (37)
For pi <
1−XLd
XLu −XLd
either the participation constraint of creditors is violated or investors’ individual
rationality is not satisfied. Hence, there is no investment and investors are left with their outside
option, which yields a utility value of zero.
Moreover,
∂R
∂pi
< 0 for pi∈
(
1−XLd
XLu −XLd
,pi∗
)
. This is obtained by total differentiating equation 15.
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Also, investors’ utility is increasing at pi. The proof is equivalent to the one outlined in proposition
1. Finally, investors optimize at pi∗ with positive investment in the safer asset. Hence, there exists a
piL ∈
(
1−XLd
XLu −XLd
,pi∗
)
such that investors start investing in the safer asset for pi> piL. The probability
threshold piL is computed by setting investors’ indirect utility to the outside option, i.e., zero, and
solving for pi. The equilibrium solution is obtained by solving equations 15, 16 and 17 for the
endogenous variables, and requiring that R > 1.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. We showed in propositions 1 and 2 that dR/dpi< 0 for pi ∈ (piL,pi∗) and pi ∈ (piH ,1). Also,
v =
1−piR
R−piR . The numerator increases faster than the denominator as pi increases and dv/dpi> 0 for
pi ∈ (piL,pi∗) and pi ∈ (piH ,1). Combining this with equation 10, which holds for pi > pi∗, and the
fact that v(pi) is continuous at pi∗ we get the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Assume first that 0 < asp < 1, hence φsp = ψsp = 0. Combining equations 20 and 21 we get
that: (
pi
(
XLu −XHu
)
+(1−pi)(XLd −XHd )) · (1−asp (XLd −XHd )−XHd )
asp
[
pi(XLu −XHu )+(1−pi)(XLd −XHd )
]
+piXHu +(1−pi)XHd −1
+XLd −XHd = 0
⇒pi(XHu ·XLd −XLu ·XHd −XHu +XHd +XLu −XLd )= 0
Thus, there is an interior solution for a only if XHu ·XLd −XHd ·XLu = XHu −XHd − (XLu −XLd ).
We now turn to the two corner solutions asp = 1 and asp = 0. Consider that the social planner
chooses to invest in asset L. Then, asp = 1, φsp > 0 and ψsp = 0. Equations 20 and 21 yields that:(
pi
(
XLu −XHu
)
+(1−pi)(XLd −XHd )) · (1−XLd )
piXLu +(1−pi)XLd −1
+XLd −XHd = pi
φsp
wsp
> 0
pi
(
XHu ·XLd −XLu ·XHd −XHu +XHd +XLu −XLd
)
> 0 (38)
For XHu ·XLd −XHd ·XLu > XHu −XHd − (XLu −XLd ), equation 38 is satisfied for all pi. Similarly, we
can show that ψsp > 0 only if XHu ·XLd −XHd ·XLu < XHu −XHd − (XLu −XLd ).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The second part of the proposition derives for proposition 1 and lemma 2. To show the
first part, we need to compute the probability threshold such that the social planner chooses to
invest in the safer asset. Denote this by piLsp. Then, piL = max
{
piL,piLsp
}
, where piL is given by
proposition 2. The Lagrange multipliers µspu = pi(1−2γΠspu ) needs to be positive. This is satisfied
for pi> piLsp =
1−XLd
XLu −XLd
.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The result for the bad state is obvious, as investors enjoy a fixed consumption in the com-
petitive equilibrium, which is pinned down by the default penalty and their risk-aversion, while in
the social planner’s solution consumption is zero. Regarding the good state, it suffices to show that
µu > µspu for every pi> pi
∗, where pi∗ is given by equation 13 for a = 1.
We prove that µspu < µu by construction. The last inequality can be reduced to
(
pi
XLu −XLd
1−XLd
−1
)−1
<
R−XLd
XLu −R
where R is given by equation 9. The left hand side (LHS) of the inequality is defined for
pi > pi =
1−XLd
XLu −XLd
, since µspu should be positive. The limit of the LHS as pi→ pi+ is +∞, while the
limit as pi→ 1 is 1−X
L
d
XLu −1
<
R−XLd
XLu −R
, since R > 1. Given that
∂
∂pi
LHS < 0, there exists a pi∗∗ such that
µspu < µu for pi> pi
∗∗. It remains to show that pi∗∗ < pi∗. Substitute pi∗∗ =
1−XLd
R−XLd
in equation 13 and
assume that a(pi∗∗)< 1, which reduces to (−1+λ)(XLu −R)> 0, a contradiction. Thus, a(pi∗∗)> 1.
In combination with lemma 1 we get that pi∗∗ < pi∗. For pi < pi∗ and pi > piH , we do not have an
analytical solution for the equilibrium variables and need to resort to numerical approximations to
compare equilibrium consumption.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. In the social planner’s solution, creditors receive XLd in the bad state of the world. In the
competitive equilibrium, the repayment is strictly less irrespective of the value for a given that
investors enjoy a private benefit, i.e. creditor receive aXLd + (1− a)XHd −
1−λ
2γ
in the bad state.
Thus, the percentage repayment for a unit of borrowed funds is lower and percentage default and
the borrowing rate are higher in the competitive equilibrium. Combining this result with equations
14, 22 and lemma 3 we get that wsp > w.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Consumption in the good and the bad state are given by Πu = w
[
a(XLu −XHu )+XHu −R
]
and Πd =
[
a(XLd −XHd )+XHd −
1−piR
1−pi
]
, respectively. Taking the total derivative with respect to
v-recall that
∂R
∂v
=−(1−pi)R2-and setting ∂Πu
∂v
=
∂Πd
∂v
= 0 we get that:
∂a
∂v
=
piΠu+(1−pi)Πd
(XHu −XLu )Πd +
(
XLd −XHd
) and ∂w
∂v
=−w
∂a
∂v
(
XLd −XHd
)−piR2
a
(
XLd −XHd
)
+XHd − 1−piR1−pi
.
∂a
∂v
> 0, thus investors have to reduce investment in the riskier asset for a higher delivery. The
effect on borrowing depends on the payoffs of assets L and H. If R2 >
XLd −XHd
XHu −XLu
, then
∂w
∂v
> 0,
otherwise
∂w
∂v
< 0. The result is intuitive. If the spread of the two payoffs in the good state
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is higher than in the bad, i.e.
XLd −XHd
XHu −XLu
< 1, then investors have to compensate for the reduc-
tion in risky investment with higher borrowing in the safer asset. For
∂w
∂v
< 0, it is obvious that
an exogenous increase of v results in a lower deadweight loss of default and thus higher welfare
given that consumption in both states in preserved. For
∂w
∂v
> 0, the deadweight loss of default
can be written as λw(R− 1) and its derivative with respect to v is = λ∂w
∂v
(R− 1)−w(1−pi)R2 =
λw
(R−1)
(
piR2− piΠu+(1−pi)Πd
(XHu −XLu )Πd+(XLd−XHd )
(
XLd −XHd
))
a
(
XLd −XHd
)
+XHd − 1−piR1−pi
(1−pi)
. The last expression is increasing
in pi. Denote by ¯¯pi, the probability that the derivative becomes zero. It is easy to show that ¯¯pi < 1.
Then for pi ∈ (pi∗, ¯¯pi), an increase in v results in a lower deadweight loss and higher welfare, while
for pi> ¯¯pi this is not the case.
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